ABSTRACT: Definitions I presented in a previous article as part of a semantic approach in epistemology assumed that the concept of derivability from standard logic held across all mathematical and scientific disciplines. The present article argues that this assumption is not true for quantum mechanics (QM) by showing that concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in classical mechanics are inapplicable to proofs in QM. Because semantic epistemology must include this important theory, revision is necessary. The one I propose also extends semantic epistemology beyond the 'hard' sciences. The article ends by presenting and then refuting some responses QM theorists might make to my arguments.
Introduction
In an earlier article, 1 I presented and defended definitions of semantic evidence in science and in mathematics as part of a general semantic approach in epistemology. The first clauses of these definitions read as follows ('SL' and 'ML' abbreviate 'scientific language' and 'mathematical language,' respectively):
(SES1) Where z is a wff of a scientific language SL, z-is-evident-in-SL for S =Df (i) There is a derivation-in-SL of z from true-in-SL instrumental-accuracy-lawsentences-of-SL and initial-condition-sentences-of-SL.
(SEM1) Where z is a wff of a mathematical language ML, z is evident-in-ML for a person S =Df (i) There is a derivation-in-ML of z.
Three assumptions were made that seemed obvious at the time: Assumption 1: SES(i) and SEM(i) are entitled to employ the same concept of derivability from standard logic. This assumption was made so that a semantic evidence predicate could be formulated along deductivist lines for both science and mathematics. 2 Assumption 2: The same concept of derivability from standard logic holds across all mathematical disciplines and their respective languages. This assumption was proved by Bertrand Russell and A.N. Whitehead in Principia Mathematica.
Assumption 3: The same concept of derivability from standard logic holds across all scientific disciplines and their respective languages. Physics has taken this assumption for granted ever since Newton's derivation of Kepler's Laws from his own.
I will show that Assumption 3 is not true for quantum mechanics (QM), likewise Assumption 1. Using as case study a proof by J.M. Jauch in his Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, 3 I show that standard concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in classical mechanics are inapplicable to proofs in QM; therefore, SES1 must be revised to include this important theory. The one I propose also extends semantic epistemology beyond the 'hard' sciences. The article ends by showing the inadequacy of some responses QM theorists might make to my arguments and suggests that the unavailability of standard logic is a reason QM may represent a paradigm shift. Assessing what exactly that entails is beyond the scope of this article.
Case Study Preliminaries
Mathematical proofs work by establishing logical links to previous results. A reductio ad absurdum proof, which Pythagoras used to show that √2 is irrational, goes about it in a special way. Here a proposition A is proved by showing that its negation, ~A, leads to contradiction, C, from which A follows because contradictions are false. G.H. Hardy thought the reductio was "one of a mathematician's finest weapons." 4 Though QM is an empirical theory -as is classical mechanics -there have also been efforts to prove results by purely logical means, including the reductio method. In his book, J.M. Jauch proved the following by reductio:
Suppose the state p is a mixture. Then there exist two different states p1 and p2, as well as two positive numbers 1 and2 such that 1 +2 = 1 and p = 1 p1 + 2 p2. Since the two states p1 and p2 are different from one another, there exists a proposition a such that p1(a) ≠ p2(a) (cf. Property 5b of Section 6-3). Since the states are dispersion-free, there are two possibilities only: p1(a) = 1, p2(a) = 0 or p1(a) = 0, p2(a) = 1. In either case we have (a) = 1 + 2 ≠ 0. Thus the state is not dispersion-free, contrary to the assumption. This proves the proposition.
In a tradition going back to Euclid, Jauch presents only information he thinks is sufficient to make it apparent that the argument is logically correct (valid) -or, as Fermat famously put it, to 'compel belief' (forcer á croire). 6 Proving that the argument is valid, however, is another matter entirely. 7 A standard way of doing that in logic is by means of a formal proof of validity (FPV), which entails making argument steps explicit all the way to the conclusion and stating the rules of logic used to derive inferred steps.
A Formal Proof of Validity of Jauch's Reductio
Jauch's Proposition 1 is a universally quantified material conditional of first-order logic and may be symbolized as
while its negation, Proposition 2, is an existentially quantified conjunction of firstorder logic and may be symbolized as
This construal of P1 and P2 is reasonable because Jauch uses the terms 'every' and 'there exist,' which denote universal and existential quantifiers, respectively, and has them apply to states characterized as dispersion-free, pure or mixed. This suggests that states are the objects of quantification in P1 and P2 6 Paul Tannery and Charles Henry, eds., OEvre de Fermat (Paris: Blanchard, 1891 -1912 The idea that syntactic validity is proved by reference to rules of inference is due to Aristotle. Unfortunately, his list of valid syllogisms, which effectively function as such rules, turned out to be inadequate for general mathematical purposes -including the FPV of Jauch's reductio below -and there the matter rested until Frege's discovery of quantification. For more on these issues, see Arnold Cusmariu, "A Methodology for Teaching Logic-Based Skills to Mathematics Students," Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3, 3 (2016): 259-292, esp. 259-261. rather than the properties of being dispersion-free, pure and mixed. Quantification in P1 and P2 is first, not second order. 8 However, strictly speaking, the negation of P1 is not P2 but rather
An FPV from P1 to P2 is needed before the full argument can get under way. Working with logical-form versions of Propositions 1 and 2 is sufficient for this purpose.
Steps Justification
From 6 by De Morgan's Theorem
From 8, 9 by MP
The FPV of Jauch's argument can now proceed.
Steps Justification
 (1) p is a dispersion-free and mixed state. From Proposition 2 by Existential Instantiation  (2) p is a dispersion-free state.
From 1 by Simp.
(3) If p is a dispersion-free and mixed state, then p consists of dispersion-free states p1 ≠ p2 such that p = 1 p1 + 2 p2 for positive numbers 1 + 2 = 1.
Assumption  (4) p consists of dispersion-free states p1 ≠ p2 such that p = 1 p1 + 2 p2 for positive numbers 1 + 2 = 1. that p = 1 p1 + 2 p2 for positive numbers 1 + 2 = 1, then, p1(a) ≠ p2(a) for some proposition a.
by Universal Instantiation 9  (6) p1(a) ≠ p2(a) for some proposition a. 
Syntactic and Semantic Validity
The above is a proof of validity in the syntactic sense, according to which an argument is syntactically valid if and only if all inferred steps are derived according to rules of logic. A concept distinct from syntactic validity is semantic validity, according to which an argument is semantically valid if and only if its conclusion is true if the premises are true for any truth-functional interpretation of premises and conclusion. That is, an argument from premises {p1, p2, p3 … pn} to conclusion c is semantically valid just in case the corresponding material conditional (p1&p2&p3& … pn) →c is a tautology.
Let us provide a proof of semantic validity in the context of Jauch's argument. It will be sufficient to do so only for a portion of the argument because it is elementary how the proof can be generalized for the entire argument.
Thus, consider the inference to step (12) from premises (10) and (11):
 (12) p is not a dispersion-free state.
For ease of reference, let us first abbreviate (10) as r; (11) as r → ~s; and (12) as ~s. The material conditional corresponding to the argument from (10) and (11) to (12) is (r & (r → ~s) → ~s). Next we enter this sentence and its components into a truth table configured according to standard semantics for logical connectives. 
If the argument from (10) and (11) to (12) is semantically valid, then we should find that the material conditional corresponding to this argument, (r & (r → ~s) → ~s), is a tautology, meaning that column 6 should show only the truth value True, which it does. This completes the proof of semantic validity for the argument from (10) and (11) to (12) and, by implication, Jauch's entire argument.
It is not a coincidence that a syntactically valid argument has turned out to be semantically valid as well. Though there is no need here to address the general problem of equivalence between syntactic and semantic validity, the following points are relevant to the arguments that will emerge shortly.
First, we note that it is standard to define logical connectives by means of binary truth values as shown in the above truth table. Thus, column 3 shows the definition of negation; column 4 of material implication; and column 5 of conjunction. Though disjunction is not shown, its definition is set by binary truth values in similar fashion. Logical connectives are in general defined by standard truth-table semantics.
Second, standard semantics for logical connectives also define the concept of a tautology.
Third, the fact that standard semantics for logical connectives define the concept of a tautology means that the definition of semantic validity also assumes such semantics.
Fourth, the definition of syntactic validity also assumes standard semantics for logical connectives because: (a) logically compound sentences occur routinely in arguments, certainly mathematical arguments; and (b) rules of logic applied to derive inferred steps assume such semantics.
Point (b) may be obviated by noting that rules of logic such as MP, applied in the FPV above, assume standard semantics for material implication; and by noting that MP works because it is itself a semantically valid argument, meaning that a tautology corresponds to it. A truth table will show that the symbolic sentence corresponding to MP, (p & (p → q)) → q, is indeed a tautology. It is apparent that standard semantics for material implication and conjunction must be assumed to show that this sentence is a truth-table tautology.
Logical Connectives and QM's Uncertainty Principle
According to truth tables defining standard semantics for logical connectives, the following sentences are tautologies:
Thus, all eight rows of column 9 linking D1 components in columns 7 and 8 by means of material implication show the truth-value True. 
Likewise, all four rows of column 7 linking D3 components in columns 1 and 6 by means of material implication show the truth-value True.
We wish to show that the Uncertainty Principle (UP) of QM is not consistent with the tautological status of D1 and D3. Let us consider them in turn.
UP-D1 Inconsistency: The equivalence
is the rule of replacement Distribution, which is a conjunction of material conditionals: Note first that the scenarios described by the three propositions p, q and r, taken singly, are consistent with UP. Second, scenario p & (q v r), the antecedent of D1, is also consistent with UP, and is in fact one of several truth-functional combinations of p, q and r that are consistent with UP.
However  p is the proposition that a measurement of the momentum of a particle will yield a value in B1.
 q is the proposition that a (simultaneous) measurement of the position of a particle will yield a value in B2.
 ~q is the proposition that a (simultaneous) measurement of the position of a particle will not yield a value in B2. 16 Even though p is consistent with UP, nevertheless according to UP it is neither the case that p & q nor that p & ~q. That is, according to UP, we should find at least one row in the truth Jauch no doubt would have claimed that his argument for Proposition 1 valid in the intuitive sense that no errors of logic were committed, which is true as we have seen. If asked, he would have claimed further that his argument was valid in the sense of 'valid' that applies to all valid mathematical proofs. I wish to show that Jauch's acceptance of UP 17 and his implicit rejection of D1 and D3 as tautologies undermines the second claim. 18 Because validity has a syntactic as well as a semantic meaning, proving this point requires two arguments. Let us take them in turn. 19 This premise would need to be restated slightly to run the argument with D3 because D3 is not a rule of logic. There is no need to do that for present purpose. 20 It is sufficient for present purposes to focus only on the inconsistency between UP and D1.
Argument 2: Semantic Validity (a2) Jauch's argument is valid according to the standard definition of semantic validity only if for any truth-functional interpretation of logically compound premises and conclusion, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true.
(b2) For any truth-functional interpretation of logically compound premises and conclusion, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true only if standard semantics define logical connectives in premises and conclusion.
(c2) If standard semantics define logical connectives in premises and conclusion, then standard semantics define conjunction, disjunction and material implication.
(d2) If standard semantics define conjunction, disjunction and material implication, then D1 is a tautology. (g1*) is true based on the three propositions p, q and r specified above: p is the proposition that the momentum of particle x is in the interval [0, +1/6], q is the proposition that the position of particle x is in the interval [−1, +1], r is the proposition that the position of particle x is in the interval [+1, +3] If the Uncertainty Principle is true, then (g1*) is true given p, q and ras above. Since (g1*) and (g1) are equivalent, it follows that (g1) is also true.
Premise (h1): UP must be assumed to be true, certainly by QM theorists. 
shows that if standard semantics define logical connectives in premises (columns 1 and 4) and conclusion (column 5), then standard semantics define conjunction, disjunction and material implication. Disjunction occurs in the column 5 sentence because material implication is definable in terms of it. Premise (d2): This follows from the truth table of D1. Premise (e2): This is the same as premise (f1) above. Premise (f2): This is the same as premise (g1) above. Premise (g2): This is the same as premise (h1) above.
Rescuing Semantic Epistemology
It would be quite an undertaking to devise a non-standard concept of derivability -call it 'derivability*' -and then complicate SES1 as follows:
(SES2) Where z is a wff of a scientific language SL, z-is-evident-in-SL for S =Df (i) Either there is a derivation-in-SL or a derivation*-in-SL of z from true-in-SL instrumental-accuracy-law-sentences-of-SL and initial-condition-sentences-of-SL.
This is unnecessary. We can borrow the disjunctive form of SES2 and then rely on the fact that QM makes essential use of the concept of probability:
(SES3) Where z is a wff of a scientific language SL, z-is-evident-in-SL for S =Df Either (i) there is a derivation-in-SL of z from true-in-SL instrumental-accuracylaw-sentences-of-SL and initial-condition-sentences-of-SL, or (ii) the probability of z is certainty or practically certainty relative to true-in-SL instrumentalaccuracy-law-sentences-of-SL and initial-condition-sentences-of-SL; and either (iii) the derivation-in-SL of z is believed-in-SL by S, or (iv) or the relative probability of z as certainty or practically certainty is believed-in-SL by S.
A link weaker than deduction may enable us to widen the circle of semantic knowledge to include fields not considered 'hard' sciences such as psychology, anthropology and sociology. Thus, SES3 addresses a concern raised in the earlier article. 21 The semantic definition of scientific knowledge can remain unchanged. 22
Some QM Responses Considered
It is far beyond the scope of this article to evaluate efforts to cope with the unavailability of standard logic in QM by replacing it with what has come to be called 'quantum logic,' 23 including how quantum logic might formulate an FPV of Jauch's reductio argument. Instead, let us consider two interesting strategies that QM proponents might suggest to counter Arguments 1 and 2. 21 Cusmariu, "Toward a Semantic Approach," 542. I realize more needs to be said to make clear how SES3 would cover semantic knowledge in fields not considered 'hard' sciences. However, the matter is too complex to treat adequately in an article of this scope. 22 Cusmariu, "Toward a Semantic Approach," 536.
STRATEGY 1: Redefine logical connectives using three-valued logic. Comment: Hans Reichenbach has proposed redefining logical connectives using three-valued logic as a way of avoiding having to characterize statements about unobserved entities as meaningless. 24 Does adding a third truth-value, Indeterminate, and building new truth tables for the usual logical connectives resolve the problem? 25 It does not, for D1 as well as D3. In the D1-associated scenario, the three propositions p, q and r are all true.
p is the proposition that the particle has momentum in the interval [0, +1/6], q is the proposition that the particle is in the interval [−1, +1], and r is the proposition that the particle is in the interval [+1, +3]. 25 Peter Gibbins writes: "There are those that try to impose on quantum mechanics a logic that does not arise naturally from the formalism of the theory. Such is Reichenbach's interpretation which employs a 3-valued truth functional logic and which is generally admitted to be a nonstarter." Gibbins, Particles and Paradoxes, 124. Gibbins also makes a startling admission: "… what the [logical] connectives mean is a real problem in the philosophy of quantum mechanics. All attractive routes for defining them independently of the formalism of quantum mechanics seem to be blocked (I think they are blocked.) If this is so, the scope of quantum logic as a 'logic of the world' will be restricted (as I think it is)." Gibbins, Particles and Paradoxes, 140. 26 [I]t is natural to divide mathematics into two parts, which have been called mathematics of approximation and the mathematics of precision. If we desire to explain this difference by an interpretation of the equation f(x) = 0, we may note that, in the mathematics of approximation one is not concerned that f(x) should be exactly zero, but merely that its absolute value | f(x) | should remain below the attainable threshold of exactness ε. The symbol f(x) = 0 is merely an abbreviation for the inequality | f(x) | <ε, with which one is really concerned. It is only in the mathematics of precision that one insists that the equation f(x) = 0 be exactly satisfied.
Comment 2: Strategy 2 suggests an instrumentalist approach to mathematics, according to which mathematical resources are merely tools for computation, measurement, approximation, and the like. In QM, such a viewpoint is sometimes expressed by the admonition to "shut up and calculate." Thus, QM physicists have argued that the theory has been confirmed by experiments, has undeniable explanatory and predictive power, and that can be the end of it as far as physics is concerned.
Well and good but instrumentalism does not imply that any of the premises of Arguments 1 and 2 are false. Indeed, how could it? Those premises belong in the realm of logic alongside the 'mathematics of precision' -just as Plato thought. In any case, Klein was surely correct to note, at the end of the passage quoted above, that the mathematics of precision provides "valuable and indeed indispensible support for the development of mathematics of approximation." 29 The claim that QM needs only the mathematics of approximation is wishful thinking.
Concluding Remarks
Physics from Newton to Einstein is compatible with the logic that Russell and Whitehead placed at the foundations of mathematics in Principia Mathematica, including the concepts of proof and validity they worked hard to clarify. If the arguments presented here are sound, such compatibility does not hold for quantum mechanics -a disconnect that seems radical enough to warrant considering the theory a paradigm shift and may help explain why Richard Feynman famously quipped 30 "I think I can safely say that nobody understands quantum mechanics. 
